Infrastructures are increasingly deployed in many data centers, either for using the IT resources for internal IT needs or for offering a public cloud service. One of the key components of this virtualized infrastructure is the virtual network -a software-defined communication fabric that links together the various Virtual Machines (VMs) to each other and to the physical host on which the VMs reside. Because of its key role in providing connectivity among VMs and the applications hosted on them, Virtual Networks have to be securely configured to provide the foundation for the overall security of the virtualized infrastructure in any deployment scenario. The objective of this paper is to illustrate a deployment-driven methodology for deriving a security configuration for Virtual Network. The methodology outlines two typical deployment scenarios, identifies use cases associated with the scenarios, identifies security requirements for implementation of the use cases, describes the virtual network security configuration required to meet the requirements and then analyzes the pros and cons of the security solutions underlying the configuration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtualized infrastructures are increasingly deployed in many data centers, driven by cost, efficiency, scalability and in some cases security considerations. These infrastructures could be deployed either for internal IT needs or for offering public cloud services. One of the key components of this virtualized infrastructure is the virtual network [1] -a software-defined communication fabric that links together the various Virtual Machines (VMs) to each other and to the physical host on which the VMs reside. The VMs are instantiated and managed by a piece of software called "Hypervisor" which in turn is installed in many instances directly on a physical hardware which we shall refer to as Virtualized Host.
It is in fact the hypervisor that provides the API and the functional code necessary to define and configure a virtual network linking the various VMs with each other and to the virtualized host where they (Hypervisor and the VMs) all reside. Since virtual network in the context of networking as a whole is an overloaded term [24] , it is good to clarify the semantics of the term "Virtual Network" in the context of the virtualized infrastructure discussed in this paper. In our context, the term virtual network encompasses the following two aspects:  Software-enabled NIC Virtualization [2] :
Here a physical Network Interface Card (NIC) in a virtualized host is shared among many Virtual OSs (called as Guest OS, Virtual Machines or Domains depending upon the product offering). This sharing is possible through a software-defined artifact called Virtual NIC (or vNIC), which is a software emulation of a physical NIC. Each vNIC is defined within a Virtual OS and the latter is therefore called the client of vNIC. Each vNIC may be assigned its own dedicated IP and MAC addresses. If the Virtual OSs (clients of vNIC) run a server software (e.g., Web Server, DNS Server or Firewall), they are also referred to as "Virtual Servers". The bridging of these vNICs or multiplexing of the traffic from different vNICs (and hence different VMs or Virtual Servers) for achieving the goal of sharing physical NICs is achieved using a software defined switch called vSwitch [3] . Links between vNICs and vSwitches are software-emulated links and so are the links between vSwitches and physical NICs (the later are also called uplinks).  Segmentation of Software-emulated Network: In addition, a software-emulated network can be segmented by forming virtual links using the concept of data path virtualization [2] (as opposed to virtualizing a link using multiplexing in the case of a physical channel or creation of virtual circuit). This segmentation is however enabled, in the software-emulated network we are discussing, by virtual switches (a node of the software-emulated network) rather by the communication channel (using some of its properties such as the bandwidth) as in most types of networks. These virtual switches (vSwitches) have the capability to define dynamic multiple port groups within it (just like ports in a physical switch). These port groups are tagged with what are known as Virtual LAN (VLAN) tags [4] . These tags or labels are used by virtual switches to create multiple virtual links (data paths). Thus VLAN tags achieve two different objectives -to share the same infrastructure (e.g., the LAN infrastructure or communication channel) as well as creating data paths in the broadcast domain. In Summary, the virtual network in the context of this paper is a "software-emulated network which generates traffic that is injected into the real world through a non-virtual/nonemulated physical NIC" [2] and has the following building blocks:  Virtual Servers (Clients of vNICs)  Virtual NICs  Virtual Switches (vSwitch)  Virtual Links and  Physical NICs.
In addition to the above components, we also include external switches/routers attached to virtualized hosts (more specifically to the physical NICs of the hosts) also under the umbrella of the "virtual network" since they play a role in configuration of the virtual network (e.g., inter-VLAN routing). Other components such as VLAN ID/Port Group, Software-defined firewalls & IDS/IPS installed as Virtual Security Appliance (VSA), Load Balancers etc (sometimes packaged as Virtual Appliances) are also included since they are artifacts used in a virtual network configuration as well.
Having settled on the semantics for the virtual network, let us turn our attention to the role of virtual networks in a virtualized infrastructure. While the hypervisor kernel provides the process-level isolation for the VMs, it is the virtual network that provides the connectivity between the VMs and the applications hosted on them. Hence, secure configuration of the virtual network forms the foundation for the security of the entire virtualized infrastructure. Two significant deployment scenarios for a large virtualized infrastructure are:  Hosting Multi-tier applications with a large user base, large volume of data or high volume of transactions or all three combination  Offering a Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) public cloud service. In this scenario, VMs belonging to different cloud service clients would be co-residents in a single physical virtualized host of the infrastructure. It must be emphasized that the two deployment scenarios stated above are not mutually exclusive. For example, a 3-tier application (Consists of Web Server, Application Server & Database Server tiers) may be hosted on three different groups of VMs either by the enterprise itself (as part of its internal IT resources) or by a cloud service client (if the virtualized infrastructure is used for offering a public cloud service). In the former case, the virtualized infrastructure and all the VMs are owned by the enterprise while in the latter case, the ownership of the VMs is with the cloud service client while the virtualized infrastructure is owned by the cloud service provider.
The objective of this paper is to illustrate a methodology for obtaining a secure virtual network configuration based on deployment scenarios cited above. The methodology is based on identifying the typical set of use cases in the deployment scenarios. Section 2 lists the steps of the methodology and identifies the various use cases. Section 3 is the core material for this paper as it describes the steps of the methodology used to derive security configuration for a virtual network and also provides a security analysis of the underlying security solution. Section 4 outlines the benefits of the methodology.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING VIRTUAL NETWORK SECURITY CONFIGURATION
The methodology for deriving a virtual network security configuration has the following key steps:  STEP 1: Identify the key use cases that result from the deployment scenarios stated in the previous section. We consider only use cases that have an impact on a virtual network configuration parameters and identify those that are not within the scope of the methodology.  STEP 2: For each chosen use case, investigate the operations involved in implementing use case and the associated security requirements  STEP 3: We identify and describe the virtual network security configuration operations that will meet the security requirements and also analyze the pros and cons of the underlying security solutions.
A. Choice of Use Cases in Virtualized Infrastructure Deployments
As already mentioned, we consider here only those use cases that are relevant from the virtual network standpoint. Before identifying those use cases, we first provide here certain use cases that get a lot of attention in deployments involving virtualized infrastructures [5] , but do not impact the virtual network configuration parameters. These use cases therefore are not considered within the scope of our methodology.  Building a VM image, versioning of VM Images, maintaining the integrity of the VM images in both during storage and while using them for instantiating VM instances.  Configuring the VM OS (or Guest OS)  Configuring Endpoint (Virus & Malware) protection for VMs  Providing Access Protection for accessing VMs from an external network  Comprehensive Data Protection (Data in VM definition files and Application Data) We now identify the typical set of use cases that may require some virtual network-based configuration for their secure implementation. All these use cases by and large pertain to one or both of the two key components of the virtualized infrastructure: the Hypervisor and the VMs. They are:  Managing the Hypervisor and the elements of the infrastructure it spawns (e.g., VMs, Virtual Switches/Port Groups/VLANs etc) (MH)  Providing Selective Isolation/Connectivity between various applications/VMs (VM-CO)  A new sensitive multi-tier application with a large user base is to be provisioned (AP-PR)
III. IMPACT OF USE CASE OPERATIONS ON VIRTUAL NETWORK SECURITY CONFIGURATION
In this section, we describe the operations involved in each use case, the associated security requirements, the virtual network configuration that will meet these requirements and also analyze the underlying security solutions.
A. Management of the Hypervisor (MH)
The set of management commands sent to the hypervisor includes those that are needed for commissioning a hypervisor as well those that are needed to configure the infrastructure (Running VMs and Virtual Network Links) spawned by the hypervisor. Specifically these are the broad categories of commands sent to the hypervisor.  Commands needed to set the hypervisor's functional parameters (e.g., the CPU scheduling algorithm it uses)  The commands needed to define the topology of the virtual network (creation of virtual switches, port groups within each virtual switch and connections between vNICs provided through virtual switches as well as connections from Port groups/virtual switches to physical NICs of the virtualized host)  Commands relating to operations on VMs (e.g,, Start, Stop, Pause individual VM, Migrate a VM from one Virtualized Host to another etc -these are sometimes called VM lifecycle operations) In some hypervisor architectures, the functions relating to VM Management (VM Lifecycle operations) is offloaded to a dedicated, specially hardened VM (sometimes called Management VM). Regardless of this architectural variation, all hypervisors have an interface (called management interface) for sending these management commands. The obvious security requirements considering the sensitive nature of the operations performed by the invocation of these commands are:  MH-SR-1: The sources from which these commands originate must be restricted to some trusted sources  MH-SR-2: The management commands must be sent securely -protecting their integrity and sometimes confidentiality.  MH-SR-3: The communication channels (data paths) carrying these management commands should be logically isolated from channels carrying other types of traffic such as the data/application related traffic. Out of the three security requirements stated above, MH-SR-1 is met by restricting the set of users who are authorized to send the hypervisor management commands to some trusted administrators and by restricting the origin of the command packets to designated administrative LANs within the enterprise [6] . For accomplishing this latter objective, a dedicated software-defined firewall may have to be installed exclusively for protecting the management interface. MH-SR-2 is met by establishing a secure communication protocol such as SSH with the management interface and sending the management commands digitally signed and/or encrypted [6] . Hence the only security requirement here that has to be met through a virtual network-related security configuration is MH-SR-3. This requirement can be met using the following security configuration operations on the virtual network.  VN-SC-OP-1: Dedicate a VLAN for carrying just the hypervisor management traffic. This is accomplished by creating a port of connection type console or kernel (depending upon the hypervisor) on a virtual switch of the hypervisor and assigning a VLAN ID to that port and associating the management interface (along with its IP address) with it. A dedicated VLAN on a kernel-type port is also the preferred configuration option for supporting VM Migration commands.  VN-SC-OP-2: An added security assurance in the pursuit of isolating management traffic from all other traffic into the hypervisor can be obtained by dedicating a separate virtual switch (vSwitch) that contains the port with (management) VLAN. In other words, there should be a virtual switch containing only one port (which is of Console or Kernel type connection) with the VLAN ID of the VLAN dedicated for carrying management traffic with no other port/port groups defined on it. The security solution underlying the above configuration is a dedicated logical network segment for carrying management commands. From the above discussions, it should be clear that it meets only one of the three security requirements and hence is not a comprehensive solution.
B. Providing Selective Isolation/Connectivity between various applications/VMs (VM-CO)
In the previous section, the need for isolating the management traffic from the application traffic was addressed. There is also a need to provide selective isolation among traffic pertaining to different applications running in VMs. This is due to the fact that different applications running in VMs have different sensitivity levels with respect to the type of data processed or the functions/operations performed. In some instances, VMs need to be isolated based on the Line of Business (LOB) and functional departments. After isolating the VMs by the nature of the application (or LOB or Functional Department), it may be found that some business processes require that applications in the VMs of one department may need to communicate or interact with applications in VMs of other departments. These twin security requirements (Selective Isolation and Connectivity) are stated as follows:  VM-SR-1: Traffic going into/emanating from VMs running sensitive applications should be isolated from traffic pertaining to non-sensitive applications. Traffic among VMs belonging to a Line of Business (LOB) or a functional department (e.g., Accounting , Engineering etc) should be isolated from corresponding traffic from other LOBs and functional departments respectively.  VM-SC-SR-1: Communication between VMs belonging to different logical groups (Application Profile, LOB or Functional Department) should be enabled in some instances but should be governed by a security policy. There are two distinct classes of security solutions that can meet the above requirements and each will result in a different set of virtual network security configuration. These two classes are [5] :  Network Segmentation using VLAN IDs  Network Segmentation using firewalls installed as Virtual Security Appliances The virtual network-related security configuration needed for realizing the above security solutions and their analysis follows.
1) Network Segmentation using VLAN IDs: In this security solution option, groups of VMs are associated with a VLAN ID, that is assigned to one or more port groups (in the virtual switch) tagged by that VLAN ID and then the communication restrictions between VMs belonging to different VLANs are enforced through firewall rules defined in an external switch (outside the virtualized host).
 VN-SC-OP-3: Select a new VLAN ID and associate it with a port group (a type of connection) on a virtual switch that is used for sending commands to VMs. This type of port group is simply called as Virtual Machine Port Group in some hypervisors. Connect the VM (or the vNIC) or VMs that is (are) running a sensitive application (or belonging to the same LOB or functional department) to that port group.  VN-SC-OP-4: The new VLAN ID is added to the external switch's VLAN database and enabled on of its ports. This is the external switch that is connected to the virtualized host. Specifically the port on which VLAN is enabled should be connected to the physical NIC of the virtualized host which forms the uplink for the virtual switch on which the new VLAN ID is defined. This establishes a communication path from the vNIC of the VM connected to the virtual switch's portgroup and through its uplink port to the virtualized host's physical NIC and on to the external physical switch. One requirement needed for this configuration is that the port on the external switch on which VLAN is enabled should be configured as a trunk port (capable of receiving/forwarding traffic belonging to multiple VLANs). Firewall rules can then defined on this external switch to provide selective connectivity between different VLANs. Analyzing the above security solution, we find the following limitations. They are [7] :  There is a limit to the number of VLAN IDs that can be used (the figure is 4094)  If the security profiles of applications in VMs change frequently, this may require frequent re-configuration of VLANs  To enforce restrictions on inter-VLAN communication, the enforcement point is a physical firewall or the physical switch. This requires routing all traffic originating from or coming into a VM to the physical NIC of the virtualized host and on to the trunk port of a physical switch, thus increasing the latency of communication packets with consequent increase in application response times.
2) Network Segmentation using Firewalls installed as Virtual Security Appliance:
In the virtualized infrastructure, this security solution can be implemented in each of the VMs to be protected or outside those protected VMs using the hypervisor's Virtual Machine Introspection API. We only discuss the latter solution here.  VN-SC-OP-5: Install a firewall as a Virtual Security Appliance (VSA) inside a hardened VM. This appliance has the ability to enforce traffic restrictions on traffic going into any VM by virtue of its access to the hypervisor's Virtual Machine Introspection API. The packets for enforcement are fed into it by a hypervisor kernel module that forwards all or selected (based on a set of rules) packets coming into the vNIC of every VM in the virtualized host [8] . Security configuration VN-SC-OP-5 is clearly superior to VN-SC-OP-4 because of the following:  It does not consume the valuable CPU cycles in individual VMs which could otherwise be used for running the business applications.  All policies needed for the firewall can be defined centrally in the Virtual Infrastructure Management server and then pushed in to the firewall VSA running in several virtualized hosts.  Firewalls in VSA are capable of supporting sophisticated logic for traffic control rules such as the ability to define security groups based on customized criteria.
C. A new sensitive multi-tier application with a large user base is to be provisioned (AP-PR)
Being an application with a large user base, it should be housed in multiple VMs (at least the web server and database tiers), should run in a separate VLAN (being a sensitive one) and should have a load balancer to balance user access traffic among the VMs [9] . In addition, the sensitive nature of the application may call for monitoring the user access and traffic volume pattern. The sequence of new security configuration operations the provisioning task will require are: 
IV. BENEFITS & CONCLUSIONS
A methodology that derives the security configuration of a virtual network based on use case security requirements (from two typical deployment scenarios) and then analyzes the security solutions underlying the virtual network configuration has been developed in this paper. The artifacts generated by the methodology are summarized in Table 1 below. The methodology has the following two security assurance benefits:  The use-case driven virtual network configuration provides automatic traceability of the any configuration setting to a use case. It thus implicitly provides a logical basis for versioning of a particular configuration. It also provides the validity for modifying, removing or enhancing a virtual network security configuration based on the following: (a) A use case has been dropped or modified (b) A new threat scenario has necessitated the need for additional security requirements for an existing use case.  The analysis of the security solutions underlying a particular virtual network security configuration helps to ensure that the resulting configuration meets the security objectives, are appropriate for the virtualized infrastructure context and use the state of practice technology. The role of virtual networks in ensuring the security of the overall virtualized infrastructures is likely to grow with adoption of technologies like distributed virtual switches (as opposed to switches specific to a virtualized host) and attestations of boot integrity to VMs (in addition to hypervisor modules). Our methodology, being a use case driven top-down approach can be applied in these emerging virtualized infrastructure environments as well. 
